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Abstract
The stochastic multi-armed bandit model captures the tradeoff between exploration and
exploitation. We study the effects of competition and cooperation on this tradeoff. Suppose
there are k arms and two players, Alice and Bob. In every round, each player pulls an
arm, receives the resulting reward, and observes the choice of the other player but not their
reward. Alice’s utility is ΓA+λΓB (and similarly for Bob), where ΓA is Alice’s total reward
and λ ∈ [−1, 1] is a cooperation parameter. At λ = −1 the players are competing in a
zero-sum game, at λ = 1, they are fully cooperating, and at λ = 0, they are neutral: each
player’s utility is their own reward. The model is related to the economics literature on
strategic experimentation, where usually players observe each other’s rewards.
With discount factor β, the Gittins index reduces the one-player problem to the compar-
ison between a risky arm, with a prior µ, and a predictable arm, with success probability
p. The value of p where the player is indifferent between the arms is the Gittins index
g = g(µ, β) > m, where m is the mean of the risky arm.
We show that competing players explore less than a single player: there is p∗ ∈ (m, g)
so that for all p > p∗, the players stay at the predictable arm. However, the players are
not myopic: they still explore for some p > m. On the other hand, cooperating players
explore more than a single player. We also show that neutral players learn from each other,
receiving strictly higher total rewards than they would playing alone, for all p ∈ (p∗, g),
where p∗ is the threshold from the competing case.
Finally, we show that competing and neutral players eventually settle on the same arm
in every Nash equilibrium, while this can fail for cooperating players.
1 Introduction
The multi-armed bandit learning problem is a paradigm that captures the tradeoffs between
exploration and exploitation [GGW11, BCB12, Sli19, LS19]. We study the effects of competition
and cooperation on exploration in a multiplayer stochastic bandit problem, where multiple
players are selecting arms and receiving the corresponding rewards in each round. Examples of
scenarios that can be captured by this model include competing firms in a saturated market,
which can be seen as a zero-sum game where the utility of a player is the difference between their
rewards and the rewards of the opponent. At the other extreme, the interaction of organisms that
are (almost) genetically identical, such as ants and bees, can be modeled by a fully cooperative
game [Ham64] where the utility of a player is the sum of the rewards of all players.
We consider a unifying framework that interpolates between these extremes, and focus on
the so-called one-armed bandit problem, where the choices are playing a predictable arm or a
risky one. The feedback received by each player is their own reward and the action taken by the
other player. If Alice’s total reward is ΓA and Bob’s total reward is ΓB, then Alice’s utility is
ΓA + λΓB and similarly for Bob, where λ ∈ R. We study three choices for λ: the zero-sum case
(λ = −1), the fully cooperative case (λ = 1), and the neutral setting (λ = 0).
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A key question in the zero sum scenario is to quantify the value of information obtained by
exploring (i.e. experimenting with the risky arm). Note that while Alice does not know Bob’s
rewards, she may try to infer them from his actions, which in turn may lead to Bob trying to
change his actions to hide information from her. We find that under optimal play, information
is less valuable in the zero-sum game than in the single player setting, which leads to reduced
exploration compared to the one player optimum (Theorem 1). However, Theorem 2 shows that
information still has positive value. Our model is close to the games of incomplete information
analyzed by Aumann and Maschler [AM95], where a player may forego some rewards to hide
information from their opponent.
In contrast to the zero-sum scenario, we show that exploration is increased in the fully
cooperative setting compared to the single player optimum (Theorem 3). We also study the
neutral regime and find that in a range of parameters, with probability 1 the players explore in
every Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if the equilibrium is also perfect Bayesian, then the players
learn from each other: each player gets in expectation strictly higher total reward than they
would when playing alone (Theorem 4). A corollary is that with positive probability the players
do not follow the same trajectory in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
We also study the long term behavior of the players, and show that both neutral and com-
peting eventually settle on the same arm in every Nash equilibrium (Theorem 5). However,
this can fail for cooperating players, where there are Nash equilibria in which one of the players
switches infinitely often between the two arms.
Figure 1: Different regions in which players explore depending on the success probability p of the left
arm as a function of the prior µ and the discount factor β. Here m is the mean of µ, while g = g(µ, β)
is the Gittins index of the right arm, p˜ is the threshold where for all p < p˜ competing players explore, p∗
the threshold where for all p > p∗ competing players do not explore, p̂ the threshold where for all p < p̂
cooperating players explore, and p◦ the threshold above which cooperating players do not explore. M∗ is
the maximum of the support of µ. Solid intervals are non-empty, dotted intervals may be empty.
Rothschild [Rot74] studied the theory of market pricing using a two-armed bandit model and
asked the question of whether players eventually settle on the same arm. Aoyagi [Aoy98, Aoy11]
answered this question positively in the model with imperfect monitoring, where players can see
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each other’s actions but only their own rewards, under an assumption on the distributions.
Another natural feedback model is perfect monitoring, where all players see the actions
and rewards of each other. This is not interesting in the zero sum case (see Remark 4), but
in the neutral and cooperative cases it is close to classic papers in the economics of strategic
experimentation. Bolton and Harris [BH99], and Cripps, Keller, and Rady [CKR05] study
strategic experimentation with perfect monitoring, while Heidhues, Rady, and Strack [HRS15]
study imperfect monitoring where players can additionally communicate via cheap talk.
In statistical learning, there has been work on multi-player bandits (e.g., Lai, Jiang, and
Poor [LJP08]; Liu and Zhao [LZ10]), where multiple cooperating players select arms and then
collect the corresponding rewards. If the players collide at an arm, then they receive a reward
of zero. A different line of work studied the effects of competition on learning. For example,
Mansour, Slivkins, and Wu [MSW18] consider a setting where players arrive and depart over
time, while Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille [RSV07] study multi-player learning in the one-armed
bandit model, where the move from the risky to the predictable arm is irreversible.
1.1 Model
Suppose there are two players, Alice and Bob, each of which pulls one of K arms in each round.
The rewards are drawn from {0, 1}: for each arm k there is a prior distribution µk so that the
success probability is picked (by Nature) from µk before the game starts. In the finite horizon
version, the players play for T + 1 rounds indexed from 0 to T . In the discounted version, the
game continues forever, but the players have value reduced by a factor of βt for the reward in
round t, where β ∈ (0, 1)1.
Rewards In every round, each player collects the reward from the arm they pulled (even if
both chose the same arm). We denote by γA(t) and γB(t) the random variable corresponding to
the reward received by Alice and Bob, respectively in round t ≥ 0. The total reward of player
i in a finite horizon game is Γi =
∑T
t=0 γi(t), while player i’s reward in the discounted game is
Γi =
∑∞
t=0 γi(t) · βt. In every round, after selecting the arm to pull, each player observes their
own reward and the action taken by the other player, but not their reward.
Utilities The utility of each player is a combination of their own reward and the reward of the
other player. More precisely, there is a cooperation parameter λ ∈ [−1, 1] so that Alice’s utility
is uA = ΓA + λ · ΓB, while Bob’s utility is uB = ΓB + λ · ΓA. For λ = −1, we have a zero-sum
game while for λ = 1, we obtain a fully cooperative model. The case λ = 0 is the neutral regime
where each player’s utility is their own total reward.
Arms We focus on the so-called one-armed bandit problem, where there is a predictable left
arm, denoted L, with known success probability p and a risky right arm, denoted R, with a prior
µ that is not a point mass. A player is said to “explore” if that player selects the right arm at
least once. Denote by m =
∫ 1
0 x dµ(x) the mean of the prior µ, by w =
∫ 1
0 (x −m)2 dµ(x) > 0
the variance of µ, and by M∗ the maximum of the support of µ:
M∗ = sup{x ∈ [0, 1] : µ(x, 1] > 0} (1)
1This can alternatively be interpreted as the game stopping with probability 1− β in each round.
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Strategies A pure strategy for player i is a function Si :
⋃
t∈N Yt × Zit → {L,R}, where Yt is
the public history (i.e. the sequence of past actions of both players) until the end of round t− 1
and Zit is the private history of player i, containing the bits observed by i until the end of round
t− 1. Thus the pure strategy tells player i which arm to play next given the public and private
history. A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over the set of pure strategies. The
expected utility of a player is computed using the player’s beliefs about the private information
of the other player.
1.2 Our Results
We analyze the properties of the game when the players are competing (λ = −1), cooperating
(λ = 1), and neutral (λ = 0), for both the discounted and finite horizon settings.
In the discounted setting, the Gittins index g = g(µ, β) of the right arm is defined as the
infimum of the success probabilities p where playing always left is optimal for a single player.
The index was first defined by Bradt, Johnson, and Karlin [BJK56] and its importance for the
multi-armed bandit problem was shown by Gittins and Jones [GJ74]; see also [Git79, BF85].
1.2.1 Competing Players (λ = −1)
Our first theorem shows that when using optimal strategies, competing players explore less than
a single player, for both discounted games and finite horizon. This zero-sum game has a value
by Sion’s minimax theorem [Sio58].
Theorem 1 (Competing players explore less). Suppose arm L has a known probability p and
arm R has i.i.d. rewards with unknown success probability with prior µ (which is not a point
mass). Assume that Alice and Bob are playing optimally in the zero sum game with discount
factor β. Then there exists a threshold p∗ = p∗(µ, β,−1) < g, where g = g(µ, β) is the Gittins
index of the right arm, such that for all p > p∗, with probability 1 the players will not explore
arm R. More precisely, define
p∗ = p∗(µ, β, λ) = sup
{
p : arm R is explored in some Nash equilibrium
}
(2)
Then p∗(µ, β,−1) ≤ (mβ + g)/(1 + β), where m is the mean of µ.
Remark 1. Note that p∗(µ, β,−1) tends to (m+ g)/2 as β → 1.
An analogue of Theorem 1 for finite horizon is shown in Section 3 (see Theorem 6).
In the single player one-armed bandit, obtaining information about the risky arm can com-
pensate for a lower mean reward compared to the predictable arm. In the zero-sum case, the
value of acquiring information is less clear since it can be copied by the opponent in the next
round. The next theorem shows that such information still has value: competing players do not
follow a myopic policy of pulling the arm with the highest mean reward in each round.
Theorem 2 (Competing players are not completely myopic). In the setting of Theorem 1, there
exists a threshold p˜ = p˜(µ, β,−1) > m, such that for all p < p˜, with probability 1 both players
will explore arm R in the initial round of any optimal play. More precisely, define
p˜ = p˜(µ, β, λ) = inf
{
p : arm L is not explored in any Nash equilibrium
}
(3)
The proof shows that p˜(µ, β,−1) ≥ m+ βw/2, where w is the variance of µ.
Remark 2. Note that p˜ ≤ p∗ and we conjecture they are in fact equal.
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1.2.2 Cooperating Players (λ = 1)
In the fully cooperative model the players aim to optimize the same function, namely the sum
of their rewards. The players are allowed to agree on their strategies before play.
Theorem 3 (Cooperating players explore more). Consider two cooperating players, Alice and
Bob, playing a one armed bandit problem with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). The left arm has
success probability p and the right arm has prior distribution µ that is not a point mass.
Then there exists p̂ > g = g(µ, β), so that for all p < p̂, at least one of the players explores
the right arm with positive probability under any optimal strategy pair maximizing their total
reward.
We also show that cooperating players do not explore indiscriminately for every value of p.
Proposition 1 in Section 4 makes this precise by showing a non-empty interval for p in which
cooperating players do not explore.
1.2.3 Neutral Players (λ = 0)
For neutral play the utility of each player is their total reward and the solution concepts will
be Nash equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Recall player i’s strategy σi is a best
response to player j’s strategy σj if no strategy σ′i achieves a higher expected utility against σj .
A mixed strategy profile (σA, σB) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if σi is a best response for each
player i. For brevity, we refer to such strategy profiles as Nash equilibria.
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is the version of subgame perfect equilibrium for games
with incomplete information. A pair of strategies (σA, σB) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if
(i) starting from any information set, subsequent play is optimal, and (ii) beliefs are updated
consistently with Bayes’ rule on every path of play that occurs with positive probability. Such
equilibria are guaranteed to exist in this setting (see Fudenberg and Levine [FL83]).
We will say that players learn from each other under some strategies if the total expected
reward of each player is strictly higher than it would be for a single player using an optimal
strategy. This can happen if the players infer additional information from each other’s actions,
beyond the bits that they observe themselves.
Theorem 4 (Neutral players learn from each other). Consider two neutral players, Alice and
Bob, playing a one armed bandit problem with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). The left arm has
success probability p and the right arm has prior distribution µ that is not a point mass. Then
in any Nash equilibrium:
1. For all p < g(µ, β), with probability 1 at least one player explores. Moreover, the probability
that no player explores by time t decays exponentially in t.
2. Suppose p ∈ (p∗, g), where p∗ is the threshold above which competing players do not ex-
plore 2. If the equilibrium is furthermore perfect Bayesian, then every (neutral) player has
expected reward strictly higher than a single player using an optimal strategy.
We note that when p > g there are perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the players do not
explore; for example, always playing left is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
A corollary of Theorem 4 is that in the range (p∗, g) there is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium
where the (neutral) players have the same trajectory with probability 1.
2For the formal definition of p∗, see Theorem 1.
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1.2.4 Long Term Behavior
We show that in every Nash equilibrium, competing and neutral players converge to playing the
same arm forever from some point on. For λ 6∈ [−1, 0], this can fail.
Theorem 5. Consider two players, Alice and Bob, playing a one armed bandit problem with
discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). The left arm has success probability p and the right arm has prior
distribution µ such that µ(p) = 0. Then in any Nash equilibrium, in both the competing (λ = −1)
and neutral (λ = 0) cases, the players eventually settle on the same arm with probability 1.
The next example shows that when λ = 1 there are Nash equilibria where (cooperating)
players do not settle on the same arm; in particular, one of the players alternates infinitely often
between the two arms.
Example 1 (Nash equilibria where players do not converge, λ = 1). Suppose Alice and Bob are
cooperating players in a one-armed bandit problem with discount factor β, where the left arm has
success probability p and the right arm has prior distribution µ that is a point mass at m > p.
Then for every discount factor β > 1/2, there is a Nash equilibrium in which Bob visits both
arms infinitely often.
Let k ∈ N. Bob’s strategy SB is to play left in rounds 0, k, 2k, 3k, . . ., and right in the
remaining rounds. Alice’s strategy SA is to play right if Bob follows the trajectory above; if Bob
ever deviates from SB, then Alice switches to playing left forever. The strategies are depicted
in Figure 2. See section 6.1 for a proof that if k is large enough, then this is indeed a Nash
equilibrium.
Figure 2: Trajectories of the players on the main line under strategies (SA, SB) for k = 5. The
circles represent time units 0, 1, 2, . . .. The left arm has success probability p and the right arm
has prior distribution which is a point mass at m > p.
Note this Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal: both players could improve their utility
by a joint deviation to always playing right. This Nash equilibrium is also not subgame perfect
because it involves a non-credible threat by Alice (of playing left forever after any deviation by
Bob).
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1.3 Roadmap of the Paper
Section 2 includes more detailed discussion of related work. Section 3 has the analysis for com-
peting players, showing that they explore less than a single player, but are also not completely
myopic. Section 4 studies fully cooperating players, showing they explore more than a single
player. Section 5 studies neutral players, showing that they learn from each other. Section 6
studies the long term behavior of the players. Directions for future research are described in
Section 7.
2 Related Work
This work is related to several streams of research. Bandit learning problems with multiple
players have been studied in the collision model, where players are pulling arms independently.
The players are cooperating—trying to maximize the sum of rewards—and can agree on a
protocol before play, but cannot communicate during the game. Whenever there is a collision
at some arm, then no player that selected that arm receives any reward. This is motivated
by applications such as cognitive radio networks, where interference at a channel destroys the
signal for all the players involved. Several research directions in this setting include designing
algorithms that allow the players to maximize the total reward, depending on whether the
environment is adversarial (see Alatur, Levy, and Krause [ALK19], and Bubeck, Li, Peres, and
Sellke [BLPS19]) or stochastic (e.g., Kalathil [Kal14], Lugosi and Mehrabian [LM18], Bistritz
and Leshem [BL18]), and on whether they receive feedback about the collision or not (Avner
and Mannor [AM14], Rosenski, Shamir, and Szlak [RSS16], Bonnefoi et al [BBM+17], Boursier
and Perchet [BP18]. Hillel et al [HKK+13] study exploration in multi-armed bandits in a setting
with pure exploration, where players collaborate to identify an -optimal arm.
Aoyagi [Aoy98, Aoy11] studies bandit learning with the same feedback model as ours, when
there are multiple neutral players and two risky arms. The main result is that assuming a
property on the distributions of the arms, in any Nash equilibrium the players settle eventually
on the same arm. This is related to Aumann’s agreement theorem [Aum76], which shows in a
Bayesian setting that rational players cannot agree to disagree. While this game is not captured
by the formal model of the theorem in [Aum76], the result is similar conceptually.
Bolton and Harris [BH99] study a multiplayer learning problem in in the one-armed bandit
model with continuous time and perfect monitoring, where the players can observe each other’s
past actions and rewards. The main effects observed in symmetric equilibria are a free rider effect
and an encouragement effect, where a player may explore more in order to encourage further
exploration from others. Cripps, Keller, and Rady [CKR05] characterize the unique Markovian
equilibrium of the game. They also show that asymmetric equilibria are more efficient than
symmetric ones, as it is more useful for the players to take turns experimenting.
Heidhues, Rady, and Strack [HRS15] study the discrete version of this model and establish
that in any Nash equilibrium, players stop experimenting once the common belief falls below
a single-agent cut-off. They also show that the total number of experiments performed in
equilibrium differs from the single-agent optimum by at most one. [HRS15] additionally study
a model with imperfect monitoring, where the players can observe each other’s actions but only
their own rewards. The players can also communicate via cheap talk. One of the main finding
is that cheap talk is incentive compatible and the socially optimal symmetric experimentation
profile can be supported as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Klein and Rady [KR11] study the
one-armed bandit model with public monitoring, where the correlation across bandits is negative.
Rosenberg, Salomon, and Vieille [RSV] study the same model as [CKR05], except the decision
to switch from the risky arm to the safe one is irreversible.
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Another line of work in economics studies the interplay between competition and innovation
(see, e.g., D’Aspremont and Jackquemin [DJ88]). Close to our high level direction is the work
of Besanko and Wu [BW13], which studies the tradeoff between cooperation and competition in
R&D via learning in a one-armed bandit model, where the safe arm is the established product
and the risky arm is the novel product. Our model is also related to the literature on stochastic
games with imperfect monitoring (see, e.g., [APS90]).
In evolutionary biology, there is a line of research dedicated to understanding the ex-
tremely high levels of cooperation observed in social insects (see, e.g., Anderson [And84] and
Boomsma [Boo07]), including designing mathematical models to explain why eusociality would
evolve from natural selection (e.g., Nowak, Tarnita, and Wilson [NTW10]). Social learning was
studied in the context of understanding altruistic behaviors such as sharing of information about
food locations (see, e.g., Gruter, Leadbeater, and Ratnieks [GLR10]).
The theme of incentivizing exploration was studied, for example, by Kremer, Mansour, and
Perry [KMP13], and Frazier, Kempe, Kleinberg, and Kleinberg [FKKK14], where the problem is
that a principal wants to explore a set of arms, but the exploration is done by a stream of myopic
agents that have their own incentives and may prefer to exploit instead. Mansour, Slivkins, and
Syrgkanis [MSS15] design Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms for such settings.
Aridor, Liu, Slivkins, and Wu [ALSW19] empirically study the interplay between exploration
and competition in a model where multiple firms are competing for the same market of users
and each firm commits to a multi-armed bandit algorithm. The objective of each firm is to
maximize its market share and the question is when firms are incentivized to adopt better
algorithms. Multi-armed bandit problems with strategic arms have been studied theoretically
by Braverman, Mao, Schneider, and Weinberg [BMSW19], in the setting where each arm receives
a reward for being pulled and the goal of the principal is to incentivize the arms to pass on as
much of their private rewards as possible to the principle.
Immorlica, Kalai, Lucier, Moitra, Postlewaite, and Tennenholtz [IKL+11] study competitive
versions of classic search and optimization problems by converting them to zero-sum games.
One of the open questions from [IKL+11] was whether competition between algorithms im-
proves or degrades expected performance in that framework, which was answered by Dehghani,
Hajiaghayi, Mahini, and Seddighin [DHMS16] for the ranking duel and a more general class of
dueling games.
3 Competitive Play (λ = −1)
In this section we study the zero-sum game, which has value zero by symmetry. This is an
extensive-form game with an initial move by Nature; see [MSZ13, KP17].
Observation 1. If selecting L in every round is the only optimal strategy for a single player,
then in every optimal strategy for Alice in the zero sum game, she never explores, and similarly
for Bob.
Proof. If Alice explores with positive probability and Bob never explores, then her expected
net payoff will be negative by the hypothesis, since she is not learning anything from Bob’s
actions.
We also give a simple lower bound on the Gittins index, the proof of which is included for
completeness. Recall that for an arm with prior µ, we have g = g(µ, β) is the Gittins index of
the arm, m is the mean, and w is the variance of µ.
Lemma 1. Consider one arm with prior µ. Then g(µ, β) ≥ m+ βw/2.
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Proof. Suppose Alice is playing the one-armed bandit game by herself where the right arm has
distribution µ that is not a point mass and left arm has known probability p = g = g(µ, β).
Consider the following strategy for Alice:
• Round zero: play left.
• Round one: play left if 0 was observed in round zero, and right if 1 was observed.
• Round two onwards: play left.
Then by the definition of g, we have that this strategy for Alice is at most as good as retiring
and receiving g forever, and so
g
1− β ≥ m+ (1−m) ·
gβ
1− β +m
(
m1β +
gβ2
1− β
)
(4)
Recall that m ·m1 = m2 + w. Using this in (4) and rearranging, we obtain:
g ≥ m+ βw
1 +mβ
≥ m+ βw
2
(5)
Theorem 1 (Competing players explore less, discounted). Suppose arm L has a known prob-
ability p and arm R has i.i.d. rewards with unknown success probability with prior µ (which is
not a point mass). Assume that Alice and Bob are playing optimally in the zero sum game with
discount factor β. Then there exists a threshold p∗ = p∗(µ, β,−1) < g, where g = g(µ, β) is the
Gittins index of the right arm, such that for all p > p∗, with probability 1 the players will not
explore arm R. More precisely, define
p∗ = p∗(µ, β, λ) = sup
{
p : arm R is explored in some Nash equilibrium
}
Then p∗(µ, β,−1) ≤ (mβ + g)/(1 + β), where m is the mean of µ.
We establish this by showing that a player using an optimal strategy is never the first to
explore. However, each player will need as part of their strategy a contingency plan for what to
do if the other player deviates from the main path. In fact, the strategy of always playing left
is not part of any equilibrium. If Bob always plays left, then Alice can play the single player
optimum (of pulling the arm with the highest Gittins index) and win.
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider the following strategy SB for Bob: play left until Alice selects
the right arm, say in some round k. Then play left again in round k + 1, and then starting
with round k+ 2 copy Alice’s move from the previous round. In particular, Bob never plays left
first. Fix an arbitrary pure strategy SA for Alice. If SA never explores first, then we are done.
Otherwise, suppose SA explores first in round k. Then Alice’s total reward ΓA = ΓA(SA, SB)
has expectation
E(ΓA) =
k−1∑
t=0
p · βt +
∞∑
t=k
E(γA(t)) · βt .
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Bob’s total reward ΓB = ΓB(SA, SB) has expectation
E(ΓB) =
k+1∑
t=0
p · βt +
∞∑
t=k+2
E(γB(t)) · βt
=
k+1∑
t=0
p · βt +
∞∑
t=k+2
E(γA(t− 1)) · βt
=
k+1∑
t=0
p · βt +
∞∑
t=k+1
E(γA(t)) · βt+1 (6)
Note that E(γA(k)) = m. Then the difference in rewards is
E(ΓA)− E(ΓB) =
(
k−1∑
t=0
p · βt +m · βk +
∞∑
t=k+1
E(γA(t)) · βt
)
−
(
k+1∑
t=0
p · βt +
∞∑
t=k+1
E(γA(t)) · βt+1
)
= (m− p− pβ)βk + (1− β)βk ·
∞∑
t=k+1
E(γA(t)) · βt
= (mβ − p− pβ)βk + (1− β)βk ·
(
m+
∞∑
t=k+1
E(γA(t)) · βt
)
(7)
Since Bob is copying Alice, she is not learning anything from his actions, so her total reward
from round k+ 1 to ∞ is at most the maximum reward that a single player can obtain, namely
g/(1− β). Thus we can bound the difference between the players by
E(ΓA)− E(ΓB) ≤
(
mβ − p(1 + β) + g
)
βk . (8)
The right hand side of inequality (8) is negative when
mβ − p(1 + β) + g < 0 ⇐⇒ p > mβ + g
1 + β
. (9)
Note that (mβ + g)/(1 + β) ∈ (m, g) and the players do not explore arm R for any p above this
threshold. Thus p∗ ≤ (mβ + g)/(1 + β) as required.
We also show that competition reduces exploration for a large finite horizon.
Theorem 6 (Competing players explore less, finite horizon). Suppose arm L has a known
probability p and arm R has a known distribution µ with mean m. Let T be the horizon and M∗
the maximum of the support of µ. We have
1. If p > (m+M∗)/2, then the players do not explore arm R.
2. However, for every p < M∗, if T is large enough, then a single player will explore given
the same two arms.
Remark 3. Part 2 of Theorem 6 is due to Bradt, Johnson, and Karlin [BJK56] (see page 1073)
and included for comparison. We can define in the finite horizon setting an index gT = g(µ, T )
as the infimum of p where playing always left is optimal for a single player. Part 2 of Theorem 6
is equivalent to
lim
T→∞
gT = M
∗ (10)
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A similar proof shows that for any prior µ, we have
lim
β→1
g(µ, β) = M∗ (11)
Proof of Theorem 6. For part 1 of the statement, we use the same strategy SB for Bob as in
the proof of Theorem 1: play left until Alice selects the right arm, say in some round k. Then
play left again in round k + 1, and then starting with round k + 2 copy Alice’s move from the
previous round.
Fix an arbitrary pure strategy SA for Alice. If SA never plays right first we are done. If
Alice plays right for the first time in round k, then γA(k) = m. Her expected total reward can
be written as
E(ΓA) =
(
k−1∑
t=0
p
)
+m+
T∑
t=k+1
E(γA(t)) .
Since from round k + 2 Bob is copying Alice’s previous move, we have E(γB(t)) = E(γA(t− 1))
for all t ≥ k + 2. Then Bob’s total expected reward is
E(ΓB) = p · (k + 2) +
T∑
t=k+2
E(γB(t)) = p · (k + 2) +
T−1∑
t=k+1
E(γA(t)) .
If k = T , the difference in rewards is
E(ΓA)− E(ΓB) = E(γA(T ))− E(γB(T )) = m− p < 0 .
If k ≤ T − 1, by choice of p > (m+M∗)/2, the difference in rewards is bounded by
E(ΓA)− E(ΓB) = (m− p) +
(
E(γA(T ))− p
)
≤ m− 2p+ max{M∗, p} < 0 .
Thus Alice loses in expectation.
Part 2 of the statement holds since a single player (say Bob) optimizing his expected total
reward has an algorithm with sublinear regret. Formally, the expected mean of the best arm is
ξ = p · µ(0, p) +
∫ 1
p
x dµ(x) .
If p < M∗, then ξ > p. Bob’s expected reward when playing optimally can be bounded from
below by using a low regret algorithm (see, e.g., [BCB12]), which gives
E(ΓB) ≥ ξ · (T + 1)− C ·
√
T + 1, for some constant C ≥ 0
We want that
ξ · (T + 1)− C · √T + 1 > p · (T + 1)
This will hold if
T >
C2
(ξ − p)2 .
For such values of T , a regret minimizing algorithm will do better than playing left forever (in
expectation).
Theorem 2 (Competing players are not completely myopic). In the setting of Theorem 1, there
exists a threshold p˜ = p˜(µ, β,−1) > m, such that for all p < p˜, with probability 1 both players
will explore arm R in the initial round of any optimal play. More precisely, define
p˜ = p˜(µ, β, λ) = inf
{
p : arm L is not explored in any Nash equilibrium
}
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Proof. Recall that m =
∫ 1
0 x dµ(x) and w =
∫ 1
0 (x−m)2 dµ(x). Let SA and SB denote strategies
for Alice and Bob, respectively. Define
v
(p)
0 = v0 = sup
SA
inf
SB
E(ΓA(SA, SB)− ΓB(SA, SB)).
We will show there is a threshold p∗ = p∗(m,w, β) > m such that for p < p∗ we have v(p)0 > 0.
Take any mixed strategy of Alice in which she plays R in round zero and consider what
happens from round one onwards. First recall that if Alice saw 1 in round zero, then the
posterior mean is
m1 =
1
m
·
∫ 1
0
x2 · dµ(x) .
If Alice saw 0, then the posterior mean is
m0 =
1
1−m ·
∫ 1
0
x(1− x) · dµ(x) .
Note that m · (m1 −m) = (1−m) · (m−m0) = w.
Let vt(x, y) = v
p
t (x, y) denote the net value for Alice (= maxmin over mixed strategies) from
the beginning of round t, when in round 1 she plays x and Bob plays y. Here, since we will
let Alice declare her strategy first, we have y ∈ {L,R} (that is, y = L means that Bob plays
left in round 1 no matter what; similarly y = R means that he plays right in round 1) and
x ∈ {L,R, S}, where S is the following Alice round 1 strategy:
• Play left upon seeing 0 in round zero.
• Play right upon seeing 1 in round zero.
Write δ = p −m ≥ 0. Then v0(x, y) = −δ + v1(x, y). Let v˜t(x, y) be defined in the same
way as vt(x, y) when Bob knows Alice’s record in round zero. Clearly, v˜t(x, y) ≤ vt(x, y), for all
strategies x, y.
By comparing the information available to the players based on the strategies played in
rounds 0 and 1, observe:
• v2(x, L) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ {L,R, S}.
• v2(R, y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ {L,R}.
Next we bound Alice’s net value at round zero if Bob plays L and Alice plays strategy S:
v0(S,L) = −δ + βm(m1 − p) + v2(S,L) ≥ −δ + βm(m1 −m+ δ) = δ(βm− 1) + βw . (12)
If Bob plays L in round one and Alice plays R in round one no matter what bit she observed at
round zero, then we have:
v0(R,L) = −δ + β · (−δ) + v2(R,L) ≥ −2δ . (13)
If both players play right in round one we get
v0(R,R) = −δ + v2(R,R) . (14)
We establish a few facts about the net gains of the players.
Lemma 2. v˜2(L,R) = −v2(R,R).
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Proof. Recall that by definition of v˜2(L,R), Bob knows two results from the right arm, while
Alice knows only one. For v2(R,R) this is reversed, since in this case Alice knows two results
from the right arm while Bob knows only one.
Lemma 3. v2(S,R) ≥ v˜2(S,R) ≥ v˜2(L,R) = −v2(R,R).
Proof. Note the first inequality holds since for v˜2(S,R) Alice tells Bob the bit she saw in round
zero, while in the case of v2(S,R) she does not. The second inequality holds since by playing
strategy S Alice has at least as much information as when playing L in round one, so she will
do at least as well under S as she would do under L from round onwards.
By decomposing v0(S,R) into the payoff obtained in rounds zero, one, and the payoff from
round two onwards, we obtain
v2(R,R) + v0(S,R) ≥ −δ + (1−m)β(p−m0)
= −δ + β(1−m)(m−m0 + δ)
= δ [β(1−m)− 1] + βw (15)
Denote by R+S2 the mixed strategy of Alice for round one in which she plays strategy R with
probability 1/2 and strategy S with probability 1/2. By (14) and (15), we have
v0
(
R+ S
2
, R
)
≥ δ
[
β(1−m)
2
− 1
]
+
βw
2
≥ βw
2
− δ (16)
By (13) and (12), we obtain
v0
(
R+ S
2
, L
)
≥ δ
[
βm
2
− 1
]
+
βw
2
≥ βw
2
− δ (17)
Thus we can take p˜ = m+ βw/2, which completes the proof.
Remark 4. In the feedback model with perfect monitoring, where players observe each other’s
actions and rewards, the myopic strategy of selecting the arm with the highest current mean (in
each round) is optimal. The reason is that exploration gives no future (informational) advantage
to the exploring player.
In Appendix A we show improved bounds for a uniform prior and a plot with the upper and
lower bounds obtained.
4 Cooperative Play (λ = 1)
Cooperating players aim to maximize the sum of their rewards and can agree on their strategies
before the game starts. Later the players cannot communicate beyond seeing each other’s actions.
We show that when the players are cooperating they explore even more than a single player.
In particular, they explore even if the known arm has a probability p higher than the Gittins
index of the right arm.
Recall the definitions of m1 = 1m
∫ 1
0 x
2 ·dµ as posterior mean at the right arm after observing
1 in round zero, and of w = m · (m1 −m).
Theorem 3 (Cooperating players explore more, discounted). Consider two cooperating players,
Alice and Bob, playing a one armed bandit problem with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). The left arm
has success probability p and the right arm has prior distribution µ that is not a point mass.
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Then there exists p̂ > g = g(µ, β), so that for all p < p̂, at least one of the players explores
the right arm with positive probability under any optimal strategy pair maximizing their total
reward.
Proof. In this proof we write ΓA = ΓA(p) to emphasize the dependence on p. At p = g, by
definition of the Gittins index, Alice has a strategy starting at the right arm such that
E(ΓA(g)) =
g
1− β .
Suppose Bob responds by playing L in rounds zero and one, then from round two onwards copies
Alice’s previous move. Then by inequality (8), applied at p = g, we get
E
(
ΓA(g)− ΓB(g)
)
≤ (m− g)β .
Therefore
E
(
ΓA(g) + ΓB(g)
)
= 2E(ΓA(g))− E
(
ΓA(g)− ΓB(g)
)
≥ 2g
1− β + (g −m)β
Applying the same strategies at p = g + δ and comparing the total rewards to both players
staying left gives
∆p := E
(
ΓA(g) + ΓB(g)
)
− 2p
1− β = (g −m)β −
2δ
1− β .
By Lemma 1, we infer that
∆p ≥ β
2w
2
− 2δ
1− β
This is positive provided that
δ <
β2w(1− β)
4
.
Recall the index gT for finite horizon was defined in Remark 3.
Theorem 7 (Cooperating players explore more, finite horizon). Consider two cooperating play-
ers, Alice and Bob, playing a one armed bandit problem. The left arm is known and has prob-
ability p, while the right arm has a known distribution µ that is not a point mass. Let T be
the horizon and M∗ the maximum of the support of µ. Then there exists δ = δ(T ) > 0 so that
optimal players explore the right arm for all p < gT + δ.
Proof. Consider the same strategy for the players as in Theorem 6: Alice plays the one player
optimal, while Bob plays left in rounds zero and one, and then from round two onwards he
copies Alice’s move from the previous round. The expected total reward of Alice is
E(ΓA) = m+
T∑
t=1
E(γA(t)) .
Bob’s expected reward is
E(ΓB) = 2p+
T∑
t=2
E(γA(t− 1)) = 2p+
T−1∑
t=1
E(γA(t)) .
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On the other hand, the expected total reward of the players if they never explore is 2p(T + 1).
The difference between the two strategies is
∆ = E(ΓA) + E(ΓB)− 2p(T + 1) = 2p+ 2 ·
T∑
t=0
E(γA(t))−m− E(γA(T ))− 2p(T + 1) .
Given that Alice is playing her single player optimal strategy, we have that for all p ≥ gT her
total reward is bounded as follows:
∑T
t=0 E(γA(t)) ≥ gT · (T + 1). Then
∆ ≥ 2p+ 2gT · (T + 1)−m− E(γA(T ))− 2p(T + 1) = 2gT · (T + 1)−m− E(γA(T ))− 2pT .
Taking p = gT + δ for δ ≥ 0, the previous inequality is equivalent to
∆ ≥ 2gT −m− E(ΓA(T ))− 2δT .
For ∆ to be strictly positive it suffices that
E(γA(T )) < 2gT −m− 2δT (18)
Recall that limT→∞ gT = M∗ (Remark 3). Moreover, Alice’s expected reward in the last round
satisfies E(γA(T )) ≤M∗ when p < M∗.
Let α = (M∗ − m)/4. Then there exists T0 = T0(α) so that for all T ≥ T0, we have
|gT −M∗| < α. For all such T , by choice of α we have that
2gT −m− E(γA(T )) > 2(M∗ − α)−m−M∗ = M
∗ −m
2
> 0
Then inequality (18) holds for all δ < (M∗ −m)/(4T ) as required.
Note that cooperating players do prefer the predictable arm for high enough values of p.
Recall that M∗ is the maximum of the support of µ.
Proposition 1. There is a threshold p◦ < M∗ so that cooperating players do not explore for
any p > p◦.
Proof. When m < p, the best case scenario for the cooperating players is that one of them (say
Alice) plays right in round zero while Bob stays at left, and then from round one onwards both
play right and the mean of the right arm is M∗ from round one onwards. Then any strategies
SA and SB of the cooperating players will give at most this total reward, so:
E(Γ(SA)) + E(Γ(SB)) ≤ p+m+ 2βM
∗
1− β
The total reward of both players staying at the left arm is 2p/(1 − β) which is more than any
strategies involving exploration when
p+m+
2βM∗
1− β <
2p
1− β ⇐⇒ p >
(1− β)m+ 2βM∗
1 + β
Setting p◦ = ((1− β)m+ 2βM∗) /(1 + β) gives the required statement.
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5 Neutral Play (λ = 0)
In this section we study the scenario of λ = 0, where the players are only interested in their own
rewards. Recall the solution concepts are Nash equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
We start with an observation.
Observation 2. For all p < g(µ, β), in any Nash equilibrium, each player explores with strictly
positive probability.
Proof. Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium with strategies (SA, SB), in which one player - say
Alice - explores with probability zero. Then E(ΓA(SA, SB)) = p/(1− β).
Consider now the modified Alice strategy S′A of pulling the arm with the highest Gittins
index in each round (ignoring any information from Bob). Then since p < g(µ, β), there is
α ∈ (p, g) so that E(ΓA(S′A, SB)) = α/(1− β) This is strictly higher than p/(1− β), so S′A is an
improving deviation, in contradiction with (SA, SB) being an equilibrium. Then Alice explores
with strictly positive probability.
Theorem 4 (Neutral players learn from each other, discounted). Consider two neutral players,
Alice and Bob, playing a one armed bandit problem with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). The left arm
has success probability p and the right arm has prior distribution µ that is not a point mass.
Then in any Nash equilibrium:
1. For all p < g(µ, β), with probability 1 at least one player explores. Moreover, the probability
that no player explores by time t decays exponentially in t.
2. Suppose p ∈ (p∗, g), where p∗ is the threshold above which competing players do not ex-
plore 3. If the equilibrium is furthermore perfect Bayesian, then every (neutral) player has
expected reward strictly higher than a single player using an optimal strategy.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let α ∈ (p, g) denote the expected reward per round of a single player that
follows the strategy of pulling the arm with the highest Gittins index in each round.
Part 1 : Assume p < g = g(µ, β). Since p < α, there exists  > 0 so that p +  < α. Let
Λ = α/(1 − β) denote the expected total reward achievable by a single optimal player. Fix a
pair of strategies (SA, SB) that define a Nash equilibrium. Let Φk = P(Dck), where
Dk =
{
No player explores in rounds {0, . . . , k − 1} under strategies (SA, SB) .
}
Since (SA, SB) is an equilibrium, we can bound the expected reward of a single player by
Λ ≤ (1− Φk)
[
k−1∑
t=0
p · βt +
∞∑
t=k
1 · βt
]
Rearranging the terms gives
Λ ≤
k−1∑
t=0
βt
[
(1− Φk)p+ Φk
]
+
∞∑
t=k
βt .
3For the formal definition of p∗, see Theorem 1.
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Expanding the terms in the right hand side, we get a bound on α:
α ≤ (1− βk)
[
p+ Φk(1− p)
]
+ βk =⇒ α− p
1− p − β
k ≤ Φk .
Choose k so that βk ≤ (α− p)/2. Then
Φk ≥ α− p
2
=⇒ P(Dk) ≤ 1− α− p
2
.
The same argument gives that for every ` ≥ 0 we have P(Dk(`+1) | Dk`) ≤ 1 − (α − p)/2, so
inductively we obtain P(Dk`) ≤
(
1− (α− p)/2
)`
. This implies the required bound for Dt:
P(Dt) ≤
(
1− α− p
2
)bt/kc
.
Part 2 : Assume that p ∈ (p∗, g), where p∗ is the threshold from equation (2) such that com-
peting players do not explore for any p > p∗. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the total
expected reward of each player is at least α/(1− β), i.e. the single player optimum.
Suppose towards a contradiction that there was a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with strategies
(SA, SB) where at least one of the players - say Bob - was getting exactly the expected reward
of a single optimal player: E(ΓB) = α/(1 − β). Note that Alice must explore with positive
probability regardless of what Bob does, since the single player optimum does better than never
exploring. Consider now the following strategy S′B for Bob: stay left in every round until Alice
explores for the first time. If Alice’s exploration occurs in some round k, then from round k+ 1
onwards, let Bob use the optimal strategy that he would play when competing against Alice in
the corresponding zero-sum game that starts at round k (where Alice is forced to play right and
Bob left in round k, and both play optimally afterwards). By Theorem 1, if Alice does explore
the right arm at k, then when p ∈ (p∗, g) Bob wins against Alice.
Let Γ′A and Γ
′
B be the total rewards of the players under strategies (SA, S
′
B). Since the
equilibrium is perfect Bayesian, we have E(Γ′A) ≥ α/(1 − β). Moreover, since Alice is not
learning anything from Bob’s strategy S′B, she can only realize this minimum expected value by
using an optimal strategy for a single player, which requires exploring with positive probability.
We classify the trajectories realizable under strategies (SA, S′B) in two types, depending on
whether Alice explores the right arm or not on that trajectory:
1. Alice does not explore: then Bob always plays left too, so they get the same reward.
2. Alice explores: then Bob’s expected reward is strictly greater than Alice’s total reward on
that trajectory (since he wins in the corresponding zero sum game that starts with Alice’s
first exploration).
Taking expectation over all possible trajectories and noting that Alice explores with positive
probability, we get that Bob’s deviation S′B ensures he gets expected total reward strictly greater
than Alice, so E(Γ′B) > E(Γ′A) ≥ α/(1 − β) = E(ΓB) . Thus deviation S′B is profitable, in
contradiction with (SA, SB) being an equilibrium. Then both players get strictly more than the
single player optimum.
Corollary 1. With positive probability, in each perfect Bayesian equilibrium the players do not
have the same trajectory.
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Proof. The conclusion follows from part 2 of Theorem 4. If the players always had the same
trajectory, then the best total reward achievable would be the single player optimum.
In contrast, there exist Nash equilibria where the players have the same trajectory with
probability 1. Such play can be supported by using (non-credible) threats in case one of the
players deviates from the Nash equilibrium path.
Example 2 (Perfect Bayesian vs. Nash equilibrium). There is a Nash equilibrium in which both
players follow the same trajectory and play the one player optimal strategy of pulling the arm
with the highest Gittins index in each round.
To see why this is the case, define the strategies of the players as follows:
• Pull the arm with the highest Gittins index in each round, as long as the other player did
the same in the previous round.
• If in some round k one of the players, say Alice, chooses a different action, then Bob
switches to playing left forever from round k + 1 onwards (and similarly if Bob deviates).
Note that with these strategies, if Alice deviates in some round k, then she cannot learn anything
from Bob in rounds {k + 1, k + 2, . . .}. Alice also did not learn anything from Bob in rounds 0
to k since they had the same trajectory. Then Alice’s expected reward overall cannot be better
than the single player optimum, so the deviation is not strictly improving. Thus the strategies
form a Nash equilibrium.
Observation 3. For p ≥ g(µ, β), there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where the players never
explore: the pair of strategies in which each player stays left no matter what happens is a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. This is not a Nash equilibrium for p < g(µ, β), since a player can switch
to the single player optimum.
We show that the players also learn from each other in the finite horizon game. First recall
that gT is the index for finite horizon T and M∗ is the maximum of the support of µ. Formally,
we have the next theorem.
Theorem 8 (Neutral players learn from each other, finite horizon). Consider two neutral play-
ers, Alice and Bob, playing a one armed bandit problem with horizon T . The left arm has success
probability p and the right arm has prior distribution µ that is not a point mass. Then in any
subgame perfect equilibrium:
1. For all p < M∗, with probability that converges to 1 as T grows, at least one player explores.
Moreover, the probability that no player explores by time t decays polynomially in t.
2. Suppose (m+M∗)/2 < p < M∗. Then every (neutral) player has expected reward strictly
higher than a single optimal player.
Proof. Recall gT denotes the index of the right arm. Let α · (T + 1) be the expected reward of
an optimal single player, where α ∈ (p, gT ).
Part 1 : Let p < M∗. We show there exist ψ = ψ(µ, p) > 0 and C <∞ so that the inequality
P
(
No player explores in rounds {0, . . . , T} under (SA, SB)
)
≤ C · T−ψ
holds for all Nash equilibria (SA, SB).
First, since p < M∗, there exist T1 and α > p so that for all T ≥ T1, the single player
optimum over rounds {0, . . . , T} is in expectation at least α · (T + 1).
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For a sequence {Tj} monotonically decreasing (to be specified later) and for T > T1, write
Dj =
{
No player explores in rounds {0, . . . , T} under (SA, SB)
}
.
Figure 3: Depiction of the intervals induced by the sequence Tj and the events Dj .
Fix j and let k = Tj+1−Tj . A depiction of the intervals induced by the sequence Tj is given
in Figure 3. Write Φj = P(Dcj | Dj+1). Since (SA, SB) is a Nash equilibrium,
α · (Tj + 1) ≤ (1− Φj) ·
[
pk + Tj + 1
]
+ Φj ·
[
Tj+1 + 1
]
α · (k + Tj + 1) ≤ Tj + 1 + Φj · (1− p) · k + p · k .
This implies the inequality:
Φj · (1− p) · k ≥ (α− p)k − (1− α)(Tj + 1) .
Choose k such that (α− p) · k ∈
[
Tj + 1, Tj + 2
]
. We obtain
0 ≤ Tj+1 −
(
1 +
1
α− p
)
Tj ≤ 2
α− p (19)
Then
α · Tj ≤ k · Φj ≤ Φj ·
(
Tj + 2
α− p
)
=⇒ Φj ≥ α(α− p)Tj
Tj + 2
≥ α(α− p)
2
.
Now suppose T ∈ (T`, T`+1). Then
P(D`−1) ≤ P(D`−1|D`) ≤ 1− α(α− p)
2
=⇒ P(D`) ≤
(
1− α(α− p)
2
)`−1
(20)
Since {Tj} grows exponentially, by (19), the claim follows from (20).
Part 2 : The proof is similar to the discounted case, so we give a sketch highlighting the
differences. Let (SA, SB) be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where Bob gets exactly the single
player optimum: E(ΓB) = α · (T + 1). Since the horizon T is large, Alice explores with positive
probability (see part 2 of Theorem 6).
Consider deviation S′B for Bob: stay left in every round until Alice explores for the first
time (e.g. in round k), and from round k + 1 onwards, use the optimal zero-sum strategy. Let
Γ′A and Γ
′
B be the total rewards under (SA, S
′
B). Since the equilibrium is perfect Bayesian,
E(Γ′A) ≥ α · (T + 1). Alice is not learning from Bob under S′B, so she must explore with positive
probability. We classify the trajectories realizable under (SA, S′B) in two types:
1. Alice does not explore: then Bob always plays left too, so they get the same total reward.
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2. Alice explores: then by Theorem 6, Bob gets strictly more than Alice for p > (m+M∗)/2.
Taking expectation over all possible trajectories and noting that Alice explores with positive
probability, it follows that Bob’s deviation S′B ensures he gets expected total reward strictly
greater than Alice. Then we get E(Γ′B) > E(Γ′A) ≥ α · (T + 1) = E(ΓB) . Then Bob’s deviation
S′B is profitable, in contradiction with the choice of equilibrium strategies (SA, SB).
6 Long Term Behavior
In this section we study the long term trajectories of the players in a Nash equilibrium for all
values of λ.
6.1 Nash Equilibria with Oscillations (λ > 0 and λ < −1)
The next example shows that for λ > 0 there cannot be a general theorem that the players settle
on the same arm in every Nash equilibrium. The construction shows that for every λ > 0 and
every sufficiently large discount factor β < 1, there is a Nash equilibrium in which one of the
players alternates between the two arms infinitely often.
Proposition 2 (Nash equilibria where players do not converge, λ > 0). Suppose Alice and Bob
are cooperating players in a one-armed bandit problem with discount factor β, where the left arm
has success probability p and the right arm has prior distribution µ that is a point mass at m > p.
Then for every λ > 0, for any discount factor β > 1/(1 + λ), there is a Nash equilibrium in
which Bob visits both arms infinitely often.
Proof. Let k ∈ N. Define strategies (SA, SB) by:
1. Bob’s strategy SB is to visit the left arm in rounds 0, k, 2k, 3k, . . ., and the right arm in
the remaining rounds, no matter what Alice does.
2. Alice’s strategy SA is to stay at the right arm if Bob follows the trajectory above. If Bob
ever deviates from SB for the first time in some round `, then Alice plays left forever
starting with round `+ 1.
To show the strategies are in Nash equilibrium, consider first the total rewards ΓA and ΓB
obtained by Alice and Bob, respectively, on the main path under strategy pair (SA, SB) starting
from round zero:
ΓA =
m
1− β and ΓB =
m
1− β −
m− p
1− βk
It is clear that Alice has no incentive to deviate, since her deviation does not change Bob’s
behavior and adding any round of playing the left arm only worsens her own total rewards.
Consider next any strategy S′B of Bob that deviates from SB in some round `. Observe first
that the best case deviation for Bob is when he deviates in some round ` divisible by k so that
instead of playing left in the next round he plays right. Then w.l.o.g. ` = 0. The expected total
rewards under (SA, S′B) starting from round zero are
Γ′A = m+ β ·
p
1− β and Γ
′
B ≤
m
1− β
Then Bob’s utility under strategy pairs (SA, SB) and (SA, S′B), respectively, is
uB =
(1 + λ) ·m
1− β −
m− p
1− βk and u
′
B ≤
m
1− β + λ
(
m+ β · p
1− β
)
If β > 1/(1 + λ) and k is large enough, then 1− β < β · λ · (1− βk). This implies that u′B < uB,
so (SA, SB) is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
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Remark 5. In the example discussed above, if β < 1/(1 + λ), then the only Nash equilibrium is
where both players always play right.
Proposition 2 does not preclude the possibility that the players settle on the same arm in
every perfect Bayesian equilibrium when λ > 0.
For every λ < −1, there are perfect Bayesian equilibria where the players do not settle on the
same arm in the long term (for some choice of µ and β), and where a player oscillates infinitely
often between the arms.
Proposition 3 (Perfect equilibria where competing players do not converge, λ < −1). Suppose
Alice and Bob are competing in a one-armed bandit problem with discount factor β, where the
left arm has success probability p and the right arm has prior distribution µ which is a point
mass at m > p. For every λ < −1, if the discount factor satisfies β2 · |λ| > 1, then there is a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which Bob visits both arms infinitely often whenever.
Note in this case there is no uncertainty since both arms are known, so perfect Bayesian
equilibria coincide with subgame perfect equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose Alice fixes a trajectory τ for Bob that requires him to play
right in rounds 0, k, 2k, 3k, . . ., and to play left in all other rounds. Let SA be the Alice strategy
of playing left as long as Bob follows trajectory τ , while if Bob ever deviates from τ in some
round s, then SA switches to playing right forever from round s + 1 onwards. Let SB be the
Bob strategy of following trajectory τ , unless Alice ever deviates from playing left in some round
s; in that case, SB switches to playing right forever from round s + 1 onwards. Whenever the
players find themselves off the main line given by this prescription, they just play right forever.
Figure 4: Trajectories of the players on the main line under strategies (SA, SB) for k = 4. The
circles represent time units 0, 1, 2, . . ..
We claim that (SA, SB) represent a subgame perfect equilibrium. The expected total rewards
of the players under (SA, SB) on the main line of play are:
E(ΓA(SA, SB)) =
p
1− β and E(ΓB(SA, SB)) =
m− p
1− βk +
p
1− β (21)
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Then the expected utilities are:
E(uA(SA, SB)) = (1 + λ) · p
1− β + λ ·
m− p
1− βk
E(uB(SA, SB)) = (1 + λ) · p
1− β +
m− p
1− βk (22)
To check the equilibrium property, it will suffice to compare the utility each player i gets
when following Si with the utility obtained when deviating to playing left forever or to playing
right forever. Note the response of the other player to any deviation is to switch to playing
right forever, thus if there is an improving deviation S′i for player i, then there is an improving
deviation S′′i in which i plays a fixed arm forever. Moreover, since the right arm is always better,
that deviation will be to play right forever.
If Bob switches to playing right from some round on, then the highest gain can be obtained
when the switch takes place from round 1 onwards. In this case, Alice will play right forever
from round 2. Thus
E(ΓA(SA, Right)) = p+ βp+ β2 · m
1− β and E(ΓB(SA, Right)) =
m
1− β (23)
Bob’s expected utility is
E(uB(SA, Right)) = (1 + λ) · m
1− β + λ · [(p−m)(1 + β)] (24)
From equations (24) and (22), we get that E(uB(SA, Right)) < E(uB(SA, SB)) whenever
1 + β + . . .+ βk−1 >
1 + λ(1 + β)
1 + λ
=
|λ| · (1 + β)− 1
|λ| − 1 (25)
Such a k exists whenever |λ|β > 1.
For Alice the best time to deviate is just before SB tells Bob to play right (in round k − 1).
E(u′A(k − 1,∞)) =
m
1− β + λ ·
[
p+ β · m
1− β
]
(26)
On the other hand, under strategies (SA, SB), Alice’s utility from round i on is
E(uA(k − 1,∞)) = p
1− β + λp+ λβ ·
(
m− p
1− βk +
p
1− β
)
(27)
Comparing Alice’s utility before and after the deviation, we obtain
E(u′A(k − 1,∞)) < E(uA(k − 1,∞))
m− p
1− β +
λβ(m− p)
1− β <
λβ(m− p)
1− βk ⇐⇒
1 + λβ < λβ · 1− β
1− βk =
λβ
1 + β + . . .+ βk−1
⇐⇒
1 + β + . . .+ βk−1 >
|λ|β
|λ|β − 1 (28)
This holds whenever |λ|β2 > 1 and k is large enough.
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6.2 A Concentration Lemma
Lemma 4. Suppose Alice is playing a one armed bandit problem, where the left arm has success
probability p and the right arm has prior distribution µ that is not a point mass. Let R∞ denote
Alice’s total number of pulls of the right arm, Rn the number of pulls by time n, and wn the
number of successes in the first min{n,R∞} draws by Alice.
Then for each  > 0 and k ∈ N, we have
P
((|wk − kΘ| > k) ∩ (R∞ ≥ k)) ≤ 2e−2k2 (29)
Proof. Recall we are working in the probability space where Θ is picked according to µ and
every toss of the risky arm is a Bernoulli variable with parameter Θ.
The goal is to show the next inequality holds for every k:
P
((|wk − kΘ| > k) ∩ (R∞ ≥ k) | Θ) ≤ 2e−2k2 (30)
Fix a value of k. It will be enough to show that the following inequality holds for every n:
P
((|wk − kΘ| > k) ∩ (Rn ≥ k) | Θ) ≤ 2e−2k2 (31)
We define an auxiliary variable w˜k to represent the number of successes in the first k pulls, but
where the pulls are padded in case their number is too low. That is, if Rn ≥ k, then w˜k = wk.
Otherwise, if Rn < k, then add another k−Rn pulls after time n and let w˜k denote the number
of successes in the first k pulls defined this way. Note the containment((|wk − kΘ| > k) ∩ (Rn ≥ k)) ⊆ (|w˜k − k ·Θ| > k).
Using Hoeffding’s inequality applied to the k pulls of the risky arm, we have
P
(
|w˜k − k ·Θ| > k | Θ
)
≤ 2e−2k2 (32)
This implies inequality (31), and so (30) also holds. Taking expectation in (30) implies the
required inequality (29).
6.3 Neutral Players in the Long Term
Theorem 9 (Neutral players eventually settle on the same arm). Consider two neutral players,
Alice and Bob, playing a one armed bandit problem with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). The left arm
has success probability p and the right arm has prior distribution µ such that µ(p) = 0. Then in
any Nash equilibrium, with probability 1 the players eventually settle on the same arm.
We sketch the intuition behind the proof. If both players explore finitely many times, then
we are done. Otherwise, there is a player, say Alice, who explores infinitely many times. Then
Alice will eventually know which arm is better, so if she continues exploring we must have Θ > p.
Thus if Bob sees that Alice keeps exploring, he will eventually realize that Θ > p and will join
her at the right arm. One technical obstacle to overcome is that Θ might be very close to p,
which delays the time at which Alice determines the better arm.
Proof of Theorem 9. Let (SA, SB) be an arbitrary pair of strategies in Nash equilibrium.
For each round n, let H in be the history from player i’s point of view up to round n; this
contains the actions of both players until the end of round n− 1, the rewards of player i in the
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first n− 1 rounds, and the action prescribed to player i by strategy Si for round n. Let N be a
stopping time for player i.
Let Θ̂ik be the empirical mean of the success probability at the right arm as observed by
player i after k explorations, defined if Ri∞ ≥ k, where Ri∞ is player i’s total number of pulls of
the right arm.
Let  ∈ (0, 1/2). Pick δ ∈ (0, ) such that µ([p− 3δ, p+ 3δ]) < . Let δ1 ∈ (0, δ) be such that
µ([p− 3δ1, p+ 3δ1]) ≤ 2δ/2.
We start by showing that if Alice explores at least k times, for k large enough, then she will
settle afterwards on the better of the two arms with high probability. Then we will study Bob’s
behavior and show that he will also pick the better of the two arms if at least one of the players
explores k times.
We bound Alice’s expected value for pulling the right arm in the future by considering three
cases, depending on the value of Θ̂Ak .
Case 1: Θ̂Ak ≤ p− 2δ. The goal will be to show that the following event has small probability
D˜1 = {(RA∞ ≥ k + 1) ∩ (Θ̂Ak ≤ p− 2δ)}.
Let N be the (random) time of the k + 1-st exploration by Alice, if it exists, and otherwise
N =∞. Define the random variable
ΨAk = P
(
(|wk − kΘ| > kδ) ∩ (RA∞ ≥ k + 1) | HAN
)
(33)
Using Lemma 4, we get E(ΨAk ) ≤ 2e−2kδ
2 . From this we deduce by Markov’s inequality that
P(ΨAk ≥ e−kδ
2
) ≤ 2e−kδ2 (34)
We define the event D1 = {ΨAk ≤ e−kδ
2} ∩ D˜1. By Lemma 4, we have
P(D˜1 \D1) ≤ 2e−kδ2 (35)
If |Θ̂Ak − Θ| ≤ δ and D1 holds, then Θ ≤ p − δ. Let ΓA(N,∞) =
∑∞
j=0 β
j · γA(N + j) denote
Alice’s total normalized reward starting from round N under strategy SA. Then Alice’s total
reward satisfies:
1D1 E
[
ΓA(N,∞) | HAN ,Θ
]
≤ 1D1
[
1|Θ−Θ̂Ak |≤δ
(
p− δ + pβ
1− β
)
+ 1|Θ−Θ̂Ak |>δ
1
1− β
]
(36)
Taking expectation over Θ gives (since D1 ⊆ {RA∞ ≥ k + 1}):
1D1 E
[
ΓA(N,∞) | HAN
]
≤ 1D1
[
p− δ + pβ
1− β + P
(
{RA∞ ≥ k + 1} ∩ |Θ− Θ̂Ak | > δ | HAN
)
· 1
1− β
]
= 1D1
[ p
1− β − δ + Ψ
A
k ·
1
1− β
]
≤ 1D1
[ p
1− β − δ +
e−kδ2
1− β
]
(37)
Consider an alternative strategy S′A as follows: play SA until time N when it is about to
do its k + 1-st exploration. If Θ̂Ak ≤ p − 2δ and ΨAk ≤ e−kδ
2 , then play left forever, otherwise
continue with SA. Note that S′A differs from SA only on the event D1.
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Using inequality (37), on the event D1 we have that for all k > δ−2 · log 1/(δ(1− β)):
E
[
ΓA(N,∞)− Γ′A(N,∞) | HAN
]
≤
(e−kδ2
1− β − δ
)
< 0 (38)
Since the original strategies (SA, SB) are in equilibrium, we have
0 ≤ E(ΓA)− E(Γ′A) = E
[
βNΓA(N,∞)− βNΓ′A(N,∞)
]
= E
[
βN1D1 E
(
ΓA(N,∞)− ΓA′(N,∞) | HAN
)]
(39)
This forces P(D1) = 0 by (38). By inequality (35), we get that P(D˜1) ≤ 2e−kδ2 .
Case 2: Θ̂Ak ≥ p+2δ. DefineM as the first round after the k-th exploration at which Alice does
not explore. If there is no such time, then M = ∞. The goal will be to bound the probability
of the event
D˜2 = {(M <∞) ∩ (Θ̂Ak ≥ p+ 2δ)} (40)
Recall HAM is the history from Alice’s point of view until the beginning of round M and Φ
A
k
as the random variable
ΦAk = P
(
(|wk − kΘ| > k) ∩ (M <∞) | HAM
)
(41)
Using Lemma 4, we get E(ΦAk ) ≤ 2e−2k
2 . From this we deduce by Markov’s inequality that
P(ΦAk ≥ e−k
2
) ≤ 2e−k2 (42)
Define the event D2 = {ΦAk ≤ e−kδ
2} ∩ D˜2. By Lemma 4, we have P(D˜2 \D2) ≤ 2e−kδ2 .
Consider Alice’s strategy SA. If M is finite, then at round M Alice is playing left by
definition. We will upper bound Alice’s total reward from round M onwards and compare it to
the expected reward obtained by playing right in all rounds t ≥M . The following inequality is
immediate: max{Θ, p} ≤ Θ + p · 1Θ<p . By taking expectation and conditioning on the history,
on the event D2 we get E(1Θ<p | HAM ) ≤ e−kδ
2
. Then on the event D2, Alice’s expected total
reward from round M onwards under strategy SA satisfies
E
[
ΓA(M,∞) | HAM
]
≤ p+ β
1− β · E(Θ | H
A
M ) +
β · p
1− β · P
(
(Θ < p) ∩ (M <∞) | HAM
)
≤ p+ β
1− β · E(Θ | H
A
M ) +
β · p
1− β · Φ
A
k (43)
On the other hand, on the event D2, by playing right forever starting with round M , Alice’s
expected reward is Γ′A, which has expectation:
E
[
Γ′A(M,∞) | HAM
]
=
E(Θ | HAM )
1− β (44)
If Θ̂Ak −Θ ≤ δ and the event D2 holds, then Θ ≥ p+ δ. On the event D2 we have
E
[
Θ | HAM
]
≥ p+ δ − e−kδ2 (45)
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By combining inequalities (43), (44), and (45), we get that on the event D2 the following
inequalities hold for all k large enough so that e−kδ2 < δ(1− β).
E
[
ΓA(M,∞) | HAM
]
− E
[
Γ′A(M,∞) | HAM
]
≤ p+ β · p
1− β · Φ
A
k +
β
1− β · E(Θ | H
A
M )−
E(Θ | HAM )
1− β
≤ p+ βp
1− β · e
−kδ2 − E(Θ | HAM )
≤ p+ β
1− β · e
−kδ2 − p− δ + e−kδ2
=
e−kδ2
1− β − δ < 0 (46)
Consider the alternative strategy S′A defined as follows: play SA until time M when it is
about to play left. If ΦAk ≤ e−kδ
2 and Θ̂Ak ≥ p+ 2δ, then play right forever. Otherwise, continue
with SA. Similarly to Case 1, since (SA, SB) is an equilibrium, we obtain that E(ΓA)−E(Γ′A) ≥ 0.
Moreover, the strategies SA and S′A have different rewards only on the event D2, so
0 ≤ E(ΓA)− E(Γ′A) = E
[
ΓA(M,∞)− Γ′A(M,∞)
]
= E
[
βM1D2 E
(
ΓA(M,∞)− Γ′A(M,∞) | HAM
)]
(47)
By (46), we get P(D2) = 0. Recall P(D˜2 \D2) ≤ 2e−kδ2 . Then P(D˜2) ≤ 2e−kδ2 .
Case 3: Θ ∈ [p− 3δ, p+ 3δ]. By choice of δ, we have µ([p− 3δ, p+ 3δ]) < .
Case 4: |Θ− Θ̂Ak | > δ and RA∞ ≥ k. By Lemma 4, this happens with probability at most 22.
Let τAk be the round in which Alice explores for the k-th time (if R
A∞ < k, then τAk = ∞).
From cases (1− 4), we obtain that for k additionally satisfying the inequality e−kδ2 <  we have
P
(
∃ t > τAk : Alice pulls the worse arm at time t
)
≤ 7 (48)
We consider now Bob’s behavior and show that if Alice explores at least k + 1 times, then
Bob will explore at all later times with high probability. Let Q > τAk+1 be the first round after
τAk+1 where SB plays left; if there is no such round, then Q =∞.
Let H˜Q be Alice’s public history (i.e. containing the sequence of arms she played, but not
her rewards) running from round 0 until the end of round Q − 1. If Q = ∞, then H˜Q is the
whole history. Note that H˜Q is observable by Bob.
Let µ
H˜Q
denote Bob’s posterior distribution for Θ (at the end of round Q− 1) given H˜Q:
µ
H˜Q
(a, b) = P
(
Θ ∈ (a, b) | H˜Q
)
· 1Q<∞ (49)
For Q <∞, the history H˜Q is said to be “good” if µH˜Q
(
p, p+ 2δ
)
<
√
 and µ
H˜Q
(
0, p
)
< δ.
Define strategy S′B as follows: play SB until the beginning of round Q, when SB plays left. If
the history is good, then play right forever. Otherwise, continue with SB. The goal will be to
compare the total reward ΓB from strategy SB with the reward Γ′B from S
′
B.
Taking expectation over the history in (49) gives E
[
µ
H˜Q
(
a, b
)]
= P
({Θ ∈ (a, b)}∩{Q <∞}).
We additionally require that
6e−kδ21
1− β ≤ 
2δ/2 .
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By choice of δ, δ1, and k, we get
• E[µ
H˜Q
(
p, p+ 2δ
)] ≤ µ(p, p+ 2δ) ≤ 
• E[µ
H˜Q
(
0, p
)] ≤ P({Θ ∈ [0, p]} ∩ {RA∞ ≥ k + 1}) ≤ µ(p− 3δ1, p) + 6e−kδ211− β ≤ 2δ (50)
Applying Markov’s inequality in (50) gives: P
(
µ
H˜Q
(
p, p + 2δ
) ≥ √, Q < ∞) ≤ √ and
P
(
µ
H˜Q
(
0, p
) ≥ δ, Q <∞) ≤ . Combining these implies:
P
(
(Q <∞) ∩ (H˜Q is bad)
) ≤ 2√ . (51)
We claim that P
(
Q <∞ and H˜Q is good
)
= 0. On the event that H˜Q is good, we have
E
[
ΓB(Q,∞) | H˜Q
]
≤ p+ β
1− β E
[
max(Θ, p) | H˜Q
]
≤ p+ β
1− β
(
E
[
Θ | H˜Q
]
+ p · P(Θ < p | H˜Q)
)
≤ p+ β
1− β E
[
Θ | H˜Q
]
+ δ (52)
On the other hand, the reward from strategy S′B on the event that H˜Q is good is
E
[
Γ′B(Q,∞) | H˜Q
]
=
E
[
Θ | H˜Q
]
1− β . (53)
Using inequalities (52) and (53), the difference between the rewards under SB and S′B from
round Q onwards given a good history H˜Q satisfies the inequality:
∆(H˜Q) = E
[
ΓB(Q,∞)− Γ′B(Q,∞) | H˜Q
]
≤ p− E
[
Θ | H˜Q
]
+ δ (54)
For any good history H˜Q, we can bound E[Θ | H˜Q] as follows:
E
[
Θ | H˜Q
]
≥ (p+ 2δ) · µ
H˜Q
(
p+ 2δ, 1
)
+ p · µ
H˜Q
(
p, p+ 2δ
)
= p · µ
H˜Q
(
p, 1
)
+ 2δ · µ
H˜Q
(
p+ 2δ, 1
)
(55)
Then on the event that H˜Q is good: E[Θ | H˜Q] ≥ p(1 − δ) + δ ≥ p + δ/2. Replacing in (54)
implies that
∆(H˜Q) = E
[
ΓB(Q,∞)− Γ′B(Q,∞) | H˜Q
]
< −δ/3 (56)
for all good histories H˜Q when  < 1/2. Then the difference between the rewards under strategies
SB and S′B satisfies
0 ≤ E(ΓB − Γ′B) = E
[
βQ ·∆(H˜Q) · 1{H˜Q is good}
]
. (57)
This forces P
(
(H˜Q is good) ∩ (Q <∞)
)
= 0. Combining (51) and (57) implies
P(Q <∞) ≤ 2√ (58)
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By (58), the probability that Alice explores infinitely often and Bob plays left infinitely often
is bounded by 2
√
 for every , so the probability is zero. Similarly with roles reversed.
Now we can conclude the proof of convergence to the same arm. If both players explore
finitely many times, then they converge to the left arm. Otherwise, one of the players - say Alice
- explores infinitely often. This implies that Bob plays right for all but finitely many rounds.
Reversing the roles, Alice also plays right for all but finitely many rounds.
We give an example showing why the ΨAk condition is needed. In this example, the empirical
mean ΘAk is significantly below p, yet the posterior mean is larger than p.
Example 3. Let p = 0.7 and µ be the uniform distribution on [0, 1/4]∪ [3/4, 1]. Suppose that in
some history Alice obtains after k observations a value of Θ̂Ak = 0.65 < p. Then since µ has zero
mass in [1/4, 3/4], it is much more likely that Θ ∈ [3/4, 1] rather than Θ ∈ [0, 1/4]. In this case,
ΨAk is large and the strategy S
′
A does not tell Alice to stop exploring, even though Θ̂
A
k < p − 2δ
for small δ > 0.
6.4 Competing Players in the Long Term
Theorem 10 (Competing players eventually settle on the same arm). Consider two competing
players, Alice and Bob, playing a one armed bandit problem with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). The
left arm has success probability p and the right arm has prior distribution µ with µ(p) = 0. Then
in any Nash equilibrium, with probability 1 the players eventually settle on the same arm.
In this setting there is an additional difficulty compared to the neutral case: players might
refrain from switching to the optimal arm in order to not trigger an adverse reaction from the
opponent. The key to overcoming this difficulty is realizing that it is impossible for both players
to benefit from repeatedly pulling the inferior arm. Each player might subjectively believe for
some time that they are playing the better arm, but if a player keeps exploring, then their
subjective evaluation of the risky arm will converge to the objective reality.
Proof of Theorem 10. Let (SA, SB) be an optimal strategy pair. Note the strategies may be
randomized.
As in the neutral case, for each n, let H in be the history from player i’s point of view up to
round n. Let N be a stopping time for player i; this means that for every fixed n, the event
N = n is determined by H in. Then H iN is a history for player i up to round N .
Recall Θ̂ik is the fraction of successes in the first k explorations by player i and R
i∞ is the
total number of explorations by player i.
Define the events Λf = {Alice explores infinitely often and Bob explores finitely many times}
and Λ∞ = {Both players explore infinitely often}.
Choose the following parameters:
 ∈
(
0,
1− β
2
)
and δ ∈ (0, ) such that µ([p− 10δ, p+ 10δ]) <  and µ(p− 8δ) = 0 (59)
Case 1: Θ < p. We consider two sub-cases, depending on whether both players explore
infinitely often or only one player does (note that on the event that both players explore finitely
often the conclusion holds immediately).
Case 1.a: Θ < p, Alice explores infinitely often and Bob finitely many times (i.e., Λf
holds).
Define the event Sk = {Bob explores at or after Alice’s k-th exploration}. Let
1 = δ(1− β)/4 .
28
Let N` be the time of Alice’s `-th exploration if it exists, and otherwise N` =∞. Let B1(k)
be the collection of histories HANk such that P(Λf ∩ Sk | HANk) > 1 and B2(k) the collection of
histories HANk for which P(Λ
c
f | HANk) > 1. Applying the Levy zero-one law gives
lim
k→∞
P
(
Λf ∩
(
HANk ∈ B2(k)
))
= 0 . (60)
We also have
⋂∞
k=0(Λf ∩Sk) = ∅ by the definition of Λf and Sk. Together with (60), this implies
that for large enough k the next two conditions are satisfied:
P(Λf ∩ Sk) ≤ δ1 and P
(
Λf ∩
(
HANk ∈ B2(k)
)) ≤ 1 . (61)
Fix k so that (61) is satisfied for all k′ ≥ k. Letting k′ = k + 1 and taking expectation over the
history gives
P(Λf ∩ Sk+1) = E(P(Λf ∩ Sk+1) | HANk+1) ≤ δ1 .
The collection of bad histories is defined as B = B1(k + 1) ∪ B2(k + 1). Note that if the
history HANk+1 is good, then
P(Sk+1 | HANk+1) = P(Λcf | HANk+1) + P(Λf ∩ Sk | HANk+1) ≤ 21 (62)
By Markov’s inequality, we obtain:
P(HANk+1 ∈ B1(k + 1)) = P
(
P(Λf ∩ Sk+1 | HANk+1) > 1
)
≤
E(P(Λf ∩ Sk+1 | HANk+1))
1
≤ δ1
1
= δ (63)
By (63) and (61), we have
P(Λf ∩ (HANk+1 is bad)) ≤ 1 + δ (64)
Then we can define, similarly to Theorem 9, the event D˜1 and the random variable ΨAk (both
from Alice’s point of view):
D˜1 = {(RA∞ ≥ k + 1) ∩ (Θ̂Ak ≤ p− 2δ)}
ΨAk = P
(
(|wk − kΘ| > kδ) ∩ (RA∞ ≥ k + 1) | HANk+1
)
Define the event
D1 = {ΨAk ≤ e−kδ
2} ∩ D˜1 ∩ {HANk+1 is good} .
Using inequality (37) in Theorem 9, we get that Alice’s total reward from round Nk+1 on is
bounded as follows:
1D1 E
[
ΓA(Nk+1,∞) | HANk+1
]
≤ 1D1
[ p
1− β − δ +
e−kδ2
1− β
]
(65)
Bob’s expected total reward given Alice’s information is bounded, using (62), by
1D1 E
[
ΓB(Nk+1,∞) | HANk+1
]
≥ 1D1
[ p
1− β · (1− 21)
]
(66)
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Combining inequalities (65) and (66) implies that Alice’s expected utility satisfies
1D1 E
[
uA(Nk+1,∞) | HANk+1
]
= 1D1 E
[
ΓA(Nk+1,∞)− ΓB(Nk+1,∞) | HANk+1
]
≤ 1D1
[ p
1− β − δ +
e−kδ2
1− β −
p
1− β · (1− δ(1− β)/2)
]
= 1D1
[pδ
2
− δ + e
−kδ2
1− β
]
(67)
We require k to be large enough so that
e−kδ2
1− β ≤ δ (68)
Consider instead the following strategy S′A for Alice: play SA until time Nk+1 when it is about to
do its k+ 1-st exploration. If Θ̂Ak ≤ p− 2δ and ΨAk ≤ e−kδ
2 and {HANk+1 is good}, then play left
forever. (In other words, Alice deviates from SA exactly on the event D1.) Otherwise, continue
with SA. Then Alice’s expected utility from round Nk+1 on under strategy pair (S′A, SB) satisfies
1D1 E
[
u′A(Nk+1,∞) | HANk+1
]
≥ 1D1
[ p
1− β −
( p
1− β +
e−kδ2
1− β
)]
= 1D1
[−e−kδ2
1− β
]
(69)
From inequalities (67), (68) (69), we get that on the event D1, for  < 1/4, the inequality
u′A(Nk+1,∞) > uA(Nk+1,∞) holds. Since the original strategy pair (SA, SB) is optimal, we get
that P(D1) = 0.
Now consider the event
(
Λf ∩ (Θ < p)
) \ D1 and note that it is contained in the union of
the following events:
• Θ ∈ [p− 3δ, p]. Note that µ([p− 3δ, p]) < .
• Λf∩(|Θ̂Ak−Θ| > δ). By Lemma 4, the probability of this event is bounded by 2e−2kδ
2 ≤ 2δ.
• ΨAk > e−kδ
2 . By inequality (34), the probability of this event is at most 2e−kδ2 ≤ 2δ.
• Λf ∩ (HANk+1 is bad). By (64), the probability of this event is at most 1 + δ.
Since P(D1) = 0, we conclude that
P
(
Λf ∩ (Θ < p)
)
= P
((
Λf ∩ (Θ < p)
) \D1) ≤ 7
Thus taking → 0 gives P(Λf ∩ (Θ < p)) = 0, so case (1.a) occurs with probability zero.
Case 1.b: Θ < p, Both players explore infinitely often (i.e., Λ∞ holds).
For each random time N ∈ N at which player i has explored at least k times, define
Ψik = P
(
(|Θ̂ik −Θ| > δ) ∩ (Ri∞ ≥ k + 1) | H iN
)
For each player i and each ` ∈ N, let τ i` be the (random) time of the `-th exploration by that
player. Let N be the first time strictly greater than max{τAk , τBk } at which Alice explores. If
there is no such time, then N =∞.
Define the event
D = {Θ̂Ak < p− 8δ} ∩ {ΨAk ≤ δ} ∩ {max (τAk , τBk ) < N <∞}.
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Let uAN (SA, SB) = ΓA(N,∞) − ΓB(N,∞) be Alice’s normalized expected utility from round
N onwards under (SA, SB) and define uAN (Left, SB) similarly when she plays left forever from
round N on the event D. Since strategy pair (SA, SB) is optimal, Alice does at least as well by
playing SA as she would do by playing left from round N onwards on the event D:
E
[
uAN (SA, SB)1D | HAN
]
≥ E
[
uAN (Left, SB)1D | HAN
]
≥
(
p− E
[
γB(N) | HAN
]
− β · e
−kδ2
1− β
)
1D, (70)
since Bob’s action at time N is not influenced by Alice’s action at time N . On the other hand,
Alice’s utility can be bounded from above by
E
[
uAN (SA, SB)1D | HAN
]
≤ E
[
γA(N)1D | HAN
]
− E
[
γB(N)1D | HAN
]
+ E
[
uAN+1(SA, SB)1D | HAN
]
Alice’s expected reward in round N on the event D is at most
E
[
γA(N)1D | HAN
]
≤ E
[
Θ · 1D | HAN
]
= E
[
Θ · 1D1|Θ̂Ak −Θ|>δ | H
A
N
]
+ E
[
Θ · 1D1|Θ̂Ak −Θ|≤δ | H
A
N
]
≤ ΨAk · 1D + E
[
(p− 7δ)1D | HAN
]
≤ (p− 6δ)1D (71)
Then we can bound Alice’s normalized expected utility from round N on by
E
[
uAN (SA, SB)1D | HAN
]
≤ (p− 6δ)1D − E
[
γB(N)1D | HAN
]
+ E
[
uAN+1(SA, SB)1D | HAN
]
(72)
Let η ∈ (0, δ) so that µ([p− 8δ− 2η, p− 8δ+ 2η]) < δ(1− β). Select k large enough so that
e−kη2
1− β ≤ δ (73)
Comparing inequality (72) to (70) yields
E
[
uAN+1(SA, SB)1D | HAN
]
≥
(
6δ − β · e
−kδ
1− β
)
1D ≥ 5δ · 1D (74)
Taking expectation over the history gives
E
[
uAN+1(SA, SB)1D
]
≥ 5δ · P(D) (75)
Define the event
D∗ =
{
Θ < p− 8δ
}
∩
{
max (τAk , τ
B
k ) < N <∞
}
.
We argue that the event D∗ is well approximated by the event D by showing their symmetric
difference is small. By the choice of k in (73), we have
P(ΨAk ≥ δ) ≤ 2δ(1− β) and P(|Θ̂Ak −Θ| > η) ≤ 2δ(1− β) .
The symmetric difference is included in the union of the following events:
D∗4D ⊂
{
Θ ∈ [p− 8δ − 2η, p− 8δ + 2η]} ∪ {|Θ̂Ak −Θ| > η} ∪ {ΨAk ≥ δ}
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By choice of δ, η, and k, we obtain
P(D∗4D) = E(|1D − 1D∗ |) ≤ 5δ(1− β)
This implies that
E
[
uAN+1(SA, SB)|1D∗ − 1D|
]
≤ 1
1− β · 5δ(1− β) = 5δ (76)
Combining (76) with (75) implies
E
[
uAN+1(SA, SB)1D∗
]
≥ 5δ · P(D)− 5δ (77)
Define an event similar to D for Bob:
D′ =
{(
Θ̂Bk < p− 8δ
) ∩ (ΨBk ≤ δ) ∩ (max{τAk , τBk } < N)}
Then Bob’s normalized expected utility from round N onwards given his history satisfies
E
[
uBN+1(SA, SB) · 1D′ | HBN
]
≥ E
[
uBN+1(SA, Left) · 1D′ | HBN
]
(78)
≥ −e
−kδ2
1− β1D′ ≥ −δ (79)
A similar argument to the proof of (76) gives
E
[
uBN+1(SA, SB)1D∗
]
≥ −δ− 5δ (80)
Since the game is zero-sum, adding (77) and (80) gives
0 = E
[
uAN+1(SA, SB)1D∗
]
+ E
[
uBN+1(SA, SB)1D∗
]
≥ 5δ · P(D)− 11δ
This implies that P(D) ≤ 3.
Note the containment{(
Θ < p− 9δ) ∩ (max{τAk , τBk } < N <∞)} ⊂ D ∪ {(|Θ− Θ̂Ak | ≥ δ) ∪ (ΨAk > δ)}
Since P(D) ≤ 3 and P(|Θ− Θ̂Ak | ≥ δ) ≤  and P(ΨAk > δ) ≤ , we get
P
((
Θ < p− 9δ) ∩ (max{τAk , τBk } < N <∞)) ≤ 5 .
By the choice of δ, since
(
RA∞ = RB∞ =∞
) ⊆ (max{τAk , τBk } < N <∞), this implies that
P
((
Θ < p
) ∩ (RA∞ = RB∞ =∞)) ≤ 6
Letting → 0 implies that case (1.b) occurs with probability zero.
Case 2. Θ > p. We define M as a stopping time with the following property: M is the first
time where M > τAk and M > τ
B
k and Bob plays left at time M under SB. If there is no such
time, then M = ∞. Let S′B be the following Bob strategy: play SB until time M − 1. From
round M on, play right.
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Similarly to the neutral players case, let H˜M be Alice’s public history (i.e. containing the
sequence of arms she played but not her rewards) running from round 0 until the end of round
M − 1. If M =∞, then H˜M is the whole history. Note that H˜M is observable by both players
at the beginning of round M + 1. For M <∞, define
H˜M is good ⇐⇒ µH˜M
(
p, p+ 2δ
)
<
√
 and µ
H˜M
(
0, p
)
< δ .
Let D = {(H˜M is good) ∩ (M <∞)}.
By combining cases (1.a) and (1.b) for competing players, we get that
P
(
(Θ < p) ∩ (RA∞ =∞)) = 0
Thus, for sufficiently large k, we get
P
(
(Θ < p) ∩ (RA∞ ≥ k + 1)) < 2δ . (81)
We follow the formulas from (49) to (51) of the analysis for neutral players, with the only change
that in (50) we use the bound from (81). Thus we obtain the same bound as in (51):
P
(
(M <∞) ∩ (H˜M is bad)
) ≤ 2√ . (82)
Define S′B as the following Bob strategy: play SB until the end of round M − 1. At round
M , if D holds, then play right forever. Otherwise, continue with SB. On the event D, since
µ
H˜M
(0, p) < δ, by playing right forever from round M + 1 onwards Bob guarantees a minimal
utility of at least
E
[(
uBM+1(SA, S
′
B)
)
1D | H˜M
]
≥ − δ
1− β · 1D
Let γi(M) be the reward of player i in round M under strategies (SA, SB) and γ′i(M) the
reward of player i in round M under strategies (SA, S′B). Note that γA(M) = γ
′
A(M). Then
E
[(
uBM (SA, S
′
B)
)
1D | H˜M
]
= E
[(
γ′B(M)− γ′A(M)
)
1D | H˜M
]
+ E
[(
uBM+1(SA, S
′
B)
)
1D | H˜M
]
≥
(
p+
δ
2
)
1D − E
[(
γA(M)
)
1D | H˜M
]
− δ
1− β · 1D (83)
For strategy pair (SA, SB) we get
E
[(
uBM (SA, SB)
)
1D | H˜M
]
= E
[(
γB(M)− γA(M)
)
1D | H˜M
]
+ E
[(
uBM+1(SA, SB)
)
1D | H˜M
]
= p · 1D − E
[(
γA(M)
)
1D | H˜M
]
+ E
[(
uBM+1(SA, SB)
)
1D | H˜M
]
(84)
Since E
[(
uBM (SA, SB)
)
1D | H˜M
]
≥ E
[(
uBM (SA, S
′
B)
)
1D | H˜M
]
, by combining the previous
inequalities we obtain
p · 1D − E
[(
γA(M)
)
1D | H˜M
]
+ E
[(
uBM+1(SA, SB)
)
1D | H˜M
] ≥(
p+
δ
2
)
1D − E
[(
γA(M)
)
1D | H˜M
]
− δ =⇒
E
[(
uBM+1(SA, SB)
)
1D | H˜M
] ≥ δ
2
· 1D (85)
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On the other hand, Alice can ensure a utility of at least −δ/(1 − β) from round M + 1
onwards by always playing right, and so
E
[(
uAM+1(SA, SB)
)
1D | H˜M
] ≥ − δ
1− β · 1D (86)
Since the game is zero-sum, we obtain that
0 = E
[
uBM+1(SA, SB)
]
+ E
[
uAM+1(SA, SB)
] ≥ (δ
2
− δ
1− β
)
· P(D) (87)
By choice of  in (59) we have δ/2 − δ/(1 − β) > 0, so P(D) = 0. Combined with inequality
(82), we get that P(M <∞) < 2√. This implies
P
(
(RA∞ = R
B
∞ =∞) ∩ {Bob plays left infinitely often}
)
< 2
√

By letting → 0, we conclude the latter probability must be zero. By symmetry, we obtain that
if Bob and Alice explore infinitely often, then they both settle on the right arm from some point
on with probability 1.
7 Concluding Remarks and Questions
Several open questions arise from this work:
1. Do competing and neutral players always have optimal pure strategies or is randomization
required sometimes?
2. Consider the setting with multiple risky arms. If there exist optimal pure strategies, can
they be obtained from an index analogous to the Gittins index for a single player?
3. Recall the threshold p∗ = p∗(µ, β, λ), defined in Theorem 1, is the smallest number so that
for all p > p∗ and in all Nash equilibria, the players do not explore. Similarly, p˜ = p˜(µ, β, λ)
from Theorem 2, is the largest number so that for all p < p˜, the right arm is explored in
some Nash equilibrium.
(a) Observation 3 shows that for neutral players we have p˜(µ, β, 0) ≥ g(µ, β) and Theo-
rem 3 implies that p˜(µ, β, 1) > g(µ, β). Is p˜(µ, β, 0) > g(µ, β)?
(b) Is p∗ = p˜ true in general?
(c) Are p∗ and p˜ monotone in β and λ?
4. Consider the following variant of the model in this paper: each player learns the other
player’s rewards, but with a delay of k rounds. Can one describe explicitly Nash equilibria
in this variant as Bolton and Harris [BH99] do in the model with perfect monitoring?
5. Can one induce more exploration in our model by incorporating patent protection? For
example, if Alice explores an arm for the first time, then a patent for her could mean that
Bob cannot pull that arm for k rounds afterwards, or alternatively, Bob should give Alice
a fraction α of his reward whenever he pulls that arm in the k rounds following her first
exploration.
6. When there are multiple risky arms, do neutral and competing players eventually settle
with probability 1 on the same arm in every Nash equilibrium? For neutral players, this
is a conjecture by Rotschild [Rot74] made explicit by Aoyagi [Aoy98], who solved the case
of two arms with finitely supported priors.
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A Competitive Play: Improved Bounds for a Uniform Prior
In this section we give improved bounds for the thresholds in the case of an arm with a uniform
prior. In particular, we show that both players will explore the risky arm for all p < 5/9 and
will not explore for all p > 2−√2.
Proposition 4. Let arm L have a known probability p and arm R with a uniform prior that
is common knowledge. Then both players will explore arm R with positive probability for all
p < 5/9 as the discount factor β → 1.
Proof. To prove this, we consider the scenario where in round zero Bob is forced to play L and
Alice is forced to play R, while the players can play optimally afterwards. Then we show that
Alice wins for all p < 5/9 as β → 1 regardless of Bob’s strategy, which will imply that in any
equilibrium the players will both play the right arm in round zero.
Consider now the scenario where they are forced to play as described above and define the
following strategy for Alice:
1. If the bit observed in round zero is 0, then play L in round 1. Then
• If Bob played R in round 1, then play L in round 2 and from round 3 onwards copy
Bob’s arm from the previous round.
• If Bob played L in round 1, then play optimally from round 2 onwards.
2. Else, if the bit observed in round zero is 1, then play R again in round 1. Play optimally
from round 2 onwards.
38
We show that Alice wins in expectation regardless of Bob’s counterstrategy. For round zero we
have E(γA(0)) = 1/2 and E(γB(0)) = p. Alice’s expected payoff in round 1 depends on whether
she got a 0 or a 1 in round zero: E(γA(1)) = 1/2 · p+ 1/2 · 2/3 = 1/2 · p+ 1/3.
To analyze Alice’s payoff in round two and Bob’s maximum expected reward overall we
consider two cases, depending on Bob’s move in round one. We assume that Bob plays optimally
from round two onwards. Note also that Bob’s decision for what arm to play in round one cannot
depend on Alice’s bit, so it is in fact determined at round zero.
Case 1 : Bob plays R in round one. Denote by γA(t|1, R) Alice’s reward in round t given that
she saw a 1 in round zero and that Bob’s strategy is to play R in round one, and similarly for
γA(t|0, R). Then Alice’s expected total reward is:
E(ΓA) = E(γA(0)) + E(γA(1)) · β + E(γA(2)) · β2 +
∞∑
t=3
E(γA(t)) · βt = 1
2
+ β
(
p
2
+
1
3
)
+ β2
(
p
2
+
E(γA(2|1, R))
2
)
+
1
2
∞∑
t=3
E(γA(t|1, R)) · βt + 1
2
∞∑
t=3
E(γB(t− 1|0, R)) · βt .
(88)
Bob’s expected total reward is:
E(ΓB) = p+
1
2
· β + 1
2
∞∑
t=2
E(γB(t|0, R)) · βt + 1
2
∞∑
t=2
E(γB(t|1, R)) · βt (89)
In the case where Alice observes a 1 in round zero, then Alice has an advantage from round
two onwards, so E(γA(t|1, R)) ≥ E(γB(t|1, R)) for all t ≥ 2. Using this fact and simplifying the
expressions, we obtain that Alice’s net gain in the zero sum game is
E(ΓA)− E(ΓB) ≥ 1
2
+ β
(
p
2
+
1
3
)
+
pβ2
2
− p− β
2
− 1− β
2
·
∞∑
t=2
E(γB(t|0, R)) · βt
To bound E(γB(t|0, R)) we consider two scenarios, depending on whether Bob saw a zero or
a one in round 1. Moreover, by round two Bob knows the bit seen by Alice in round zero since
her behavior is different depending on that bit. Let X1 and X2 be two random variables with
densities 3(1− x)2 and 6x(1− x) for all x ∈ [0, 1] respectively. Then
E(γB(t|0, R)) ≤ 2
3
· E(max(p,X1)) + 1
3
· E(max(p,X2)) = 1/3− 1/3 · p3
Then as β → 1, the difference in rewards is limβ→1 [E(ΓA)− E(ΓB)] ≥ 1/6 + p3/6 − p2/2.
Then Alice wins in expectation for all p ≤ 0.65.
Case 2 : Bob plays L in round one. Note we will write again γA(t|b, L) to denote Alice’s reward
in round t given that Alice saw the bit b in round zero and Bob plays left in round one. Bob’s
expected total reward is E(ΓB)) = p+ p · β +
∑∞
t=2 E(γB(t)) · βt, while Alice’s is
E(ΓA) =
1
2
+ β
(
p
2
+
1
3
)
+
1
2
·
∞∑
t=2
E(γA(t|1, L)) · βt + 1
2
·
∞∑
t=2
E(γB(t− 1|0, L)) · βt.
Again Alice has an informational advantage so she can at least equalize from round two
onwards regardless of the value of the bit observed in round zero, and so E(γA(t|b, L)) ≥
E(γB(t|b, L)) for all t ≥ 2 and b ∈ {0, 1}. The difference in expected payoffs can be bounded
in this case by E(ΓA) − E(ΓB) ≥ 1/2 + β (p/2 + 1/3) − p(1 + β). Taking β → 1 gives
limβ→1 [E(ΓA)− E(ΓB)] ≥ 5/6− 3p/2. Then Alice wins for all p < 5/9 when Bob plays left.
Taking into account both cases implies the players explore for all p < 5/9 as required.
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Proposition 5. Let arm L have a known probability p > 2 − √2 and arm R with a uniform
prior, both of which are common knowledge. Then with probability 1 the players will not explore
arm R in any equilibrium.
Proof. To analyze this, we study the game where round zero is fixed such that Alice is at the
right arm and Bob is at the left arm.
Consider the following strategy for Bob: stay at arm L in rounds zero and one, then in each
round t, where t ≥ 2, copy Alice’s move from round t− 1. Suppose Alice plays optimally given
Bob’s strategy. Then Alice’s expected total is: E(ΓA) = 1/2 +
∑∞
t=1 E(γA(t)) ·βt. For Bob, note
that E(γB(t)) = E(γA(t− 1)) for all t ≥ 2. Then his expected total reward is
E(ΓB) = p · (1 + β) +
∞∑
t=2
E(γA(t− 1)) · βt = p · (1 + β) +
∞∑
t=1
E(γA(t)) · βt+1
Bob’s expected net gain is E(ΓB)−E(ΓA) = p · (1 + β)− 1/2− (1− β) ·
∑∞
t=1 E(γA(t)) · βt. Let
X be a random variable with a uniform prior. Then Alice’s expected value at round t can be
bounded by the expected maximum of p and X, so
E(γA(t)) ≤ E(max (p,X)) =
∫ p
0
p dx+
∫ 1
p
x dx =
1
2
+
p2
2
(90)
Using the bound on E(γA(t)) above gives
E(ΓB)− E(ΓA) ≥ p · (1 + β)− 1
2
− (1− β) ·
∞∑
t=1
(
1
2
+
p2
2
)
· βt
Taking β → 1 gives limβ→1 [E(ΓB)− E(ΓA)] ≥ 2p − 1/2 −
(
1/2 + 1/2 · p2) = 2p − 1 − 1/2 · p2.
Then for all p > 2 − √2 Bob’s net gain is strictly positive, thus Alice is at a disadvantage by
playing the right arm in round zero. It follows that Alice is better off by playing the left arm in
round zero, and so the players will never explore arm R in any equilibrium.
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Figure 5: Bounds as a function of p ∈ [0.5, 1] where the right arm has a uniform prior and
β → 1: the red line shows the lower bound on Alice’s net gain given by the function lb(p) =
min{1/6 + p3/6− p2/2, 5/6− 3p/2} (Proposition 4) when in round zero she starts at the right
arm and Bob starts at left, after which they both play optimally. The green line shows the
corresponding upper bound on Alice’s net gain given by ub(p) = p2/2 + 1− 2p (Proposition 5).
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